

bound up, because I had one shot through the belly from the front and the second through both shoulders, so that the ball lodged in my shirt. The field surgeon tied my hands behind my back so that he could use a chisel. That's how I was brought back to my hut, half dead. (Ha.47)

Poyntz was wounded at the siege of Breda, 'where it was my fortune to escape with life, but to bee hurt on the right side with a pike' and at Lützen, where 'I hurt under my right side and in my thigh' (Po.46/126). Fritsch was wounded in 1626 at the siege of Coingen, 'shot in the knee and slashed across the hand'. In 1632 at Hildesheim he was hit three times by musket fire, 'so that the balls lodged in my head, in my leg, and above my eye, from which I ... suffered great pain'. This must have been less drastic than it sounds; the town surrendered three days later, and Fritsch was so quickly cured, 'through God's mercy' that he could leave ten days afterwards with his unit (F.11/133, 133). In 1636 he was wounded again, hit in the eye with a stone and then shot in the arm during an attempt at storming Paderborn. Monro too was wounded three times, at Oldenburg in 1627, at the siege of Stralsund in 1628 and at Nuremberg in 1632.

The risks of battle are central to the soldier's profession, and Raymond describes coming to terms with them at his first taste of action. 'In my first comeing before the towne my courage began somewhat to faile me, and, being younge and never being on such an employment, wrought the more upon me. I remember I had an aurange tawny leather in my capp, and at first I thought that every great gun that was discharge towards our quarters had been aymed at it.' He soon became bolder: 'But within few dayes I tooke my selfe to be a very gallant fellow, and had noe more dread of danger then if I had been in a fayre' (Ry.38). For Raymond the dangers of battle were easier to bear than the privations on campaign, which he sums up in a sharp view of a soldier's life as seen from the ranks:

And truly by what I have seene and felt, I cannott but thinck that the life of a private or common soldier is the most miserable in the world; and that not so much because his life is always in danger - that is little or nothing - but for the terrible miseries he endures in hunger and nakednes, in hard marches and bad quarters, 30 stivers being his pay for 8 days, of which they could not possibly subsist, but that they helpe themselves by forraging, stealing, furnishing wood in the feild to the officers, straw, some are coblers, taylers & c. (Ry.43)

4

Civilian Perceptions

(Civilian Life)

If for the soldier the war was in the last analysis his livelihood, the civilian was ultimately the paymaster. The princes who employed the armies had neither the resources in their own territories to pay and maintain them, nor the machinery of the modern state needed to marshal such means as they had. Instead all parties fell back upon the expedient of making the citizenry of occupied territories, whether nominally friend or enemy, pay the cost of the campaigning. The opportunity of booty was a thinly disguised way of making the soldier responsible for finding a large part of his own pay, just as units in the field were made responsible for finding a significant proportion of their own food by foraging. This solved only part of the problem for the military authorities. The troops had to be given at least some pay and rations, and cash was necessary for other military supplies. These needs were met by contributions, a euphemism for the extortion of resources in cash or kind from civilians to support the armies. In practice the military themselves organised and managed this system, rather than the princes, ministers or court bureaucracies supposedly controlling them. Delegation was necessary, and raising contributions became a responsibility of every officer with an independent command. Methods varied correspondingly, ranging from relatively systematic imposition of taxation on communities to kidnapping prominent citizens and holding them to ransom. The eyewitnesses report many approaches.

Civilian accounts of these experiences tend to be variations on a common theme. The south-west, spared the war until 1632, felt its full impact in the following two years as the Swedes advanced to this furthest corner of Germany, contested control with their Imperialist opponents and then hastily withdrew northwards to regroup after Nördlingen. In their accounts, particularly of this period, Mallinger, Zembroth and Bürster, reporting respectively from Freiburg, an important city, Allensbach, a walled village, and Salem, a large monastery in the open countryside, describe experiences typical of other places and times as recorded by eyewitness diarists.

Mortimer, G. Eyewitness Accounts ... 30Yes
War
2002.

Freiburg experienced direct involvement in the fighting, as the city changed hands six times and was also once unsuccessfully besieged late in the war, but it seems to have escaped quite lightly. Mallinger records that the Swedish advance guard, which first reached the city on 26 December 1632, 'fired quite a number of cannon shots, but did little harm'. The main force arrived two days later and began to bombard the city in earnest, in course of which they 'lobbed in 25 incendiary shots, causing great damage', whereupon the citizens, lacking a garrison of regular troops, promptly surrendered. In October 1633 the Swedes made a tactical withdrawal from the city, taking a rather formal leave: '*Nocte hora nona* Colonel Cannoschki returned the keys of the city to the councillors, released them from their oaths, and expressed thanks for all kindnesses' (Ma.536, 536, 546).

When they returned in April 1634 the experience was worse. This time Freiburg was garrisoned and it resisted with more determination. Swedish gunfire commenced at five in the morning, making a breach in the walls by midday, and after further bombardment the city was successfully stormed late at night. Mallinger reports – presumably selectively – a single casualty from the bombardment, 'an adolescent girl of noble birth, Miss von Danckenschweil', but he notes many more as the Swedes entered the city: 'Everyone they found by the walls, young and old, citizens, farmers and soldiers, some 80 men, and most of the people in the Oberriet church, were tragically killed, plundered, and left naked where they lay' (Ma.555). The city was looted but Mallinger refers only to property being seized, mentioning no violence against the citizenry after the initial onslaught. In September 1634 the Swedes evacuated Freiburg for the second time, departing without a fight after a further round of looting.

Four years later Freiburg was retaken, this time by Bernard of Weimar's forces, who appeared before the city on 1 April 1638, attempting unsuccessfully to storm it on 3 April and three times on 9 April, by which time the defenders were ready to negotiate a surrender. Mallinger does not mention plundering or give details of damage, although he says with great precision that on 9 April 'between early morning and the approach of evening 327 heavy cannon-balls were fired into the city', adding that 'the commandant, Herr Joann. Christopherus von Ramstain, from the noble German family, was shot along with 12 other citizens, journeymen and students' (Ma.587). This time the occupation lasted over six years, until the Bavarian army besieged the city on 27 June 1644. After lengthy skirmishing outside the walls serious bombardment began, and when a breach was made on 27 July the defenders duly negotiated an accord and marched away, leaving the city to its liberators: 'On the 31st, *hora 9*, *Te deum laudamus* was sung, *solemniter und musicaliter in summo templo* ... accompanied by both organs' (Ma.598).

Allensbach lies on a narrow peninsula of land forming the principal approach route to Constance, which was also an important city and the only one locally never taken by the Swedes, although they were active in the

area from the middle of 1632 to the end of 1634, and then for a full ten years from 1638 to the end of the war. For almost all this time Hohentwiel, Radolfzell and other towns were in their hands, and for much of it they also held the fortress of Mainau, on the outskirts of Constance itself. Allensbach thus lay in disputed territory, a mere ten kilometres from the Imperialists in Constance and the Swedes in Radolfzell, subject to friendly occupation or enemy raids and exploited for contributions by both sides, but it seems to have suffered less than might be expected during 13 years in a war zone. Zembroth records two attacks which were made by the Swedes in 1633 specifically to enforce the payment of contributions; on the first occasion 32 cattle were driven off and two outlying houses and a mill were burned, while on the second the same fate befell 12 houses and the church tower. In 1634 the village was 'plundered through and through in the night' by a Swedish force, and ten years later Bavarian cavalry took hay from the village, 'as much as they could carry on their horses, ... but otherwise they did no damage', while in 1647 enemy cavalry took livestock and conscripted villagers temporarily to herd them (Z.571, 575). Allensbach was also plundered during an evacuation in 1633 and perhaps during another in 1647. On the other hand troops from Hohentwiel attempting to surprise Constance marched through Allensbach in 1642 without troubling it, and they also twice marched through in 1646 during an attack on Reichenau, Zembroth specifically noting that this was 'in fact without any harm being done' on the first occasion, and that on the second the troops had 'done nothing to anyone, apart from a little damage to two houses in Cappel' (Z.575, 576).

As mayor of Allensbach Zembroth frequently had direct responsibility for meeting the demands of the military. His chronicle begins in 1632 as the Swedes approached. Bavarian units moved in to defend the area and lost no time in imposing contributions:

On the Saturday before Shrovetide representatives of the bishop's subjects everywhere within Empire territory were called to the castle in Meersburg. There a payment of 10 000 florins was called for as a contribution for the Bavarian army This had to be delivered on three occasions, the first in eight days time, the second in four weeks and the third three weeks thereafter. (Z.568)

The imposition was shared out: 'For us it came to 160 florins. I collected in the first two payments but before the third fell due the enemy had moved close to us and no-one could give any more.' Meanwhile the village had to provide 20 men to a conscript levy, although this was soon disbanded without fighting, 'but each man was given 1½ florins by the municipality.' Defence works were constructed at nearby Stahringen using conscript labour, whose thirst the commune had to quench with substantial quantities of wine; they then had to provide 10 of the 50 militiamen sent to guard

these works, and to supply each daily with 'a litre of wine and two [pounds] of bread' (Z.568).

Swedish and Württemberg troops occupied the neighbouring area that spring and Allensbach hastened to come to terms with their commandant,

von Stainfels by name, to whom four men from here were sent to make an accord. We had to give him 175 Reichstaler straight away, within two days. ... There were six fine silver goblets in the town hall, which were put towards this, and the full balance was made up in cash by the citizens. (Z.569)

The commandant offered protection in return for contributions, but Zembroth was far from satisfied: 'This same Colonel Stainfels promised that he would secure us against burning, robbery and billeting, but he kept to this badly, if at all.' A few months later 'a strong company of French cavalry descended on us. They were here for five days, and we had to keep them, together with their horses, at great expense.' A regiment also moved into Radolfzell, 'to which we had to contribute 40 florins a month. ... That was paid for six months, making 240 florins' (Z.569).

Although 1632 had been expensive Allensbach had not come off too badly. Worse was to come. In the spring of 1633 Zembroth found himself caught between two fires, the Swedes ranging the countryside and the Imperialists still in control in Constance:

They would not authorise or permit us to give any further help or to make any contributions to the enemy, either of money or of service, work or labour on fortifications. The enemy threatened us, in writing and by messenger, with military enforcement, which we reported to the authorities, his Princely Grace's councillors, and asked for their advice. But the colonel and officers at Constance... were not prepared to allow us to satisfy the enemy, declaring that if we did the least thing they would carry out a sharper and stricter enforcement than the enemy would ever do. So we were in the greatest danger. (Z.569)

Faced with this stark choice Allensbach stopped payments to the Swedes, who promptly mounted retaliatory raids, forcing the citizens to evacuate the village, which was then plundered. After their return Zembroth comments mournfully that 'as we had nothing more, no-one sought much from us. They left us to live in misery' (Z.571). In the following years Allensbach was mainly burdened with billeting, although there was still the occasional raid, but Zembroth's most recurrent theme reflects the principal effect of the war on the villagers, the obligation to pay for it through contributions. Sometimes these were arbitrary, in the form of the rations and fodder required by passing troops billeted on them, but the extortion was often more

systematic and the demands more precise. Typical was the lengthy siege of the fortress of Hohentwiel during 1635, 'to which blockade we had to give six bushels of grain, four kegs of wine and some money every month, and a tun of wine in the autumn'. In the main, contributions appear to have been calculated and shared out with some regard to the ability of the various villages to pay. In 1642 Allensbach was making contributions to three Imperialist garrisons, in Überlingen, Markdorf and Lindau respectively, their assessment in respect of the latter quite distant town being 30 florins per month. Because of damage done to the village in 1640, however, part of this burden was transferred to their better-protected neighbours; 'By comparison Wolmatingen, which had always been sheltered by the city of Constance, was in good shape, so that they had to relieve us of half of it' (Z.572, 574). Although the authorities in Constance attempted to forbid payments to the enemy this became increasingly unrealistic, and in fact the village made contributions to both sides for much of the time. By the latter years of the war a quite complex pattern had emerged:

In this above-mentioned year of 47 we had to give [Hohent]wiel a monthly contribution of ten florins, together with three tuns of wine, ... four wagonloads of grain (which we exchanged with the villagers of Blumenfeld, on whose behalf we gave Mainau 16 quarters of corn, five quarters of rye and ten quarters of oats), ... and in the spring 2000 vine stakes (which Hans Schöpfl of Hausen made for us, for which we paid him 24 florins), while instead of hay and straw we regularly paid the captain of cavalry Hans Jerg Widerholt in cash, 86 florins and 6 batzen. The same year of 47 we supplied Constance with 2½ tuns of wine, many wagons of wood for watch fires, labourers for working parties and digging fortification works every day, and 100 hundredweight of hay. Likewise to Niclaus, Baron von Gramont, commandant of Zell, two florins service money every month, and 20 kegs of wine at the beginning of the year, as well as labourers and fortification workers at that time, and we had afterwards to pay out 16 batzen a week for the labour service. (Z.577)

This passage indicates many aspects of the workings of the contributions economy. Two villages traded off their respective obligations in order that each could deliver to the nearer garrison; a requirement to supply hay and straw was commuted for a cash payment; the necessary vine stakes were bought by the village from a manufacturer; garrisons required contributions in varying combinations of cash, kind and labour; the labourers, although forced as far as the military were concerned, were in fact paid for their work by the village. Underlying this is the fact that Allensbach's principal product was wine, which had to be sold in order to buy in most of the other specified contributions. Nor did the military necessarily drink all the wine supplied to them, some of which they in turn may have sold and converted

into cash. It is thus apparent that rather than agricultural produce simply being seized on an arbitrary basis to meet the short-term needs of the troops a complex market economy was required and had to be sustained. This in turn suggests why Allensbach suffered less from raiding, robbery and violence than might at first sight have been expected; it was not in the interests of the military on either side to disrupt the production and trading economy on which they themselves depended for their long-term sustenance.

Contributions were also required from Salem after the Swedish arrival in 1632. Bürster notes: 'From this day on we had to send 400 army loaves, each of two [pounds], 15 bushels of oats, two oxen and a cart-load each of straw and hay to Ravensburg every day' (Bü.22). Mallinger says little about contributions, but in August 1633 he notes that 'they overburdened the unfortunate citizens, both rich and poor, as well as the clergy and the university, with soldiers, forcing them to give them so much as weekly upkeep and contributions that they could no longer see any salvation'. In 1639 he is more specific, recording three separate contributions required of the 'high bishopric of Basle', two of 150 and one of 300 Reichstaler. His evidence is incomplete and inconclusive but one can deduce from his limited comments that the burden imposed cannot generally have been intolerable, although he also mentions the effects of heavy extortions from the countryside to support the siege of Breisach in August 1633, 'which drove the poor people into such poverty, fear and need that they became ill through starvation and misery' (Ma.545, 589, 545). He outlines the procedure for requisitioning food in Freiburg at this time: 'They visited all the cellars and granaries. At first they wanted a third of the wine or grain, the second time they wanted half, and the third time they often took all the flour from the mills and all the bread from the bakeries' (Ma.545).

Towns were often prepared to pay a substantial initial cash sum to buy off plundering and damage, but repeated contributions over a prolonged period were another matter. The six silver goblets in Allensbach's town hall soon went and individuals became more circumspect about contributing. Mallinger describes how citizens of Freiburg who had managed to hide things from the Swedes were forced to disgorge them when their own side regained control temporarily in late 1633. The more sophisticated method of extortion used by the Imperialists was to arrest the 'masters of the guilds and many members of the council' of Freiburg, and to imprison them in the fortress of Breisach until they undertook to raise a large sum of money from the city; knowing their fellow-citizens' affairs better than the Swedes these worthies were able to coax or coerce their hidden treasures and trinkets from them:

Then they summoned one citizen after another into the market building, and required so much of them that they had to hand over everything which they had previously concealed and hidden away from the enemy

in order to have something to buy their food with in the future. One who came still had several silver goblets, which he paid over instead of cash, a second brought his wife's or daughter's silver belt and knife, while a third had sold something from his house or a young cow to help pay the money. (Ma.548)

Monks from Salem were twice held to ransom by the Swedes in 1632. On the first occasion:

They caught eight or nine of the monks, together with a number of horses and traps or coaches, into which they all had to get, and they took them with them to Ravensburg as prisoners. There they were to be held until such time as a ransom or protection money of 6000 taler was paid, which had to be promptly on the 28th, first thing in the morning. ... This 6000 taler was paid on the 28th of April, and the monks were set free again, although the time until the money arrived must have been long enough for them, as they were frequently threatened that if the ransom did not follow they would have to hang. (Bü.20-1, 21-2)

Bürster's second description vividly portrays the terror such a raid inspired as the Swedes surrounded the monastery:

Then laughter was scarce among us and all joy died, as we could see nothing but *memoria mortis*, so that many began to confess quickly to one another. ... After they had mustered and the gates had been opened to them they ordered all the clergy and lay brothers to gather together in one place. We went into the church, to the sacristy, all standing together, quaking with fear and expecting nothing other than blows and to be hacked down, but thank God we came out of it well. They wanted the prior or head of the monastery, but the rest had only to return to their places or cells and nothing was to happen to them. However the prior, at that time the *reverendissimus pater* Wilhelm Hülleson, had hidden himself away in the garden of the upper house, and as we were not prepared to betray him they took the cellar-master, then the *reverendissimum patrem* Thomas Hausser, *loco prioris, in aresto* with them to Ravensburg, so that he had to be ransomed again for 300 taler. (Bü.23-4)

The same methods were used in the smaller places too. After the Swedes had consolidated their first occupation of Freiburg Mallinger reports that raiding parties descended on the neighbouring villages: 'They not only drove off the cattle and horses, but wherever they caught a prosperous farmer or another honest man, they tied him up and took him with them. Then they put him in irons and threw him into jail until he had paid over 40 or 50, or even 100 taler' (Ma.53)